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CONGRESSIONAL CLIMATE
FOR NAVAL AVIATION

Edward G. Ingalls

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

CONGRESSIONAL CLIMATE
FOR NAVAL AVIATION

by

Edward G. Ingalls

September 1979

Thesis Advisor:

E.J. Laurance

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T189603

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Congressional Climate for Naval Aviation		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; September 1979
7. AUTHOR(s) Edward G. Ingalls		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE September 1979
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 98
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Naval Aviation budget Budget authorization Content Analysis Micromanagement		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The purpose of this thesis was to characterize the current Congressional climate for Naval Aviation budget requests. An objective approach, consisting of the measurement of three key indicators of Congressional behavior during the authorization phases of the FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980 budget cycles, was employed. These indicators were: (1) the questions asked of defense witnesses during the Hearings, (2) the funding adjustments		

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Several dimensions of the Congressional climate were analyzed, however the major conclusion reached was that Naval Aviation programs have been subjected to less micro-management and have received larger budget increases than comparable Air Force programs.

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Congressional Climate
for Naval Aviation

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

September 1979

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis was to characterize the current Congressional climate for Naval Aviation budget requests. An objective approach, consisting of the measurement of three key indicators of Congressional behavior during the authorization phases of the FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980 budget cycles, was employed. These indicators were: (1) the questions asked of defense witnesses during the Hearings, (2) the funding adjustments recommended and (3) the rationale provided for committee decisions. Examination of the first indicator led to the development of a research typology that used the technique of content analysis of the authorization hearings to measure Congressional attempts at micro-management. Measurement of the latter two indicators employed techniques developed and commonly used by earlier researchers. The same three indicators were measured for comparable Air Force Tactical Aviation programs to provide a basis for comparison.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	9
A.	THE OBJECTIVE -----	9
B.	THE APPROACH -----	11
C.	ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT -----	12
II.	BACKGROUND -----	13
A.	CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY ROLE AS ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION -----	13
B.	THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS -----	15
C.	CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND DOD -	19
III.	APPROACH TO ANALYSIS -----	24
A.	GENERAL APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS -----	24
B.	HEARING QUESTIONS -----	27
1.	Methodology -----	27
2.	Development of the Analytical Framework ---	29
3.	The Analysis -----	35
C.	FUNDING ADJUSTMENTS -----	35
1.	Methodology -----	35
2.	The Analysis -----	36
D.	REASONS GIVEN FOR COMMITTEE DECISIONS -----	37
1.	Methodology -----	37
2.	The Analysis -----	40
IV.	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS -----	42
A.	HEARING QUESTIONS -----	42
B.	FUNDING ADJUSTMENTS -----	52

1.	Comparison of Navy and Air Force Programs --	53
a.	NET CHANGE to the Budget Request -----	53
b.	ABSOLUTE CHANGE to the Budget Request --	56
2.	Influence of the Committees -----	60
C.	REASONS GIVEN FOR COMMITTEE DECISIONS -----	63
1.	Comparison of Navy and Air Force Programs --	64
2.	Influence of the Committee -----	67
V.	CONCLUSIONS -----	69
A.	REVIEW OF THE KEY INDICATORS MEASURED -----	69
1.	Hearing Questions -----	69
a.	Subject Matter -----	69
b.	Micromanagement -----	69
c.	Committee Influence -----	70
2.	Funding Adjustments -----	70
a.	Net Changes -----	70
b.	Absolute Changes -----	70
c.	Committee Influence -----	70
3.	Reasons Given for Committee Decisions -----	71
a.	Fiscal/Programmatic Decisions -----	71
b.	Committee Influence -----	71
B.	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS -----	71
APPENDIX A	-----	78
APPENDIX B	-----	83
APPENDIX C	-----	85
APPENDIX D	-----	86
APPENDIX E	-----	90

APPENDIX F ----- 92

BIBLIOGRAPHY ----- 94

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ----- 98



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge the assistance, support and understanding provided by my wife during all stages of this thesis. Somehow, she always knew the right thing to say and do.



I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE OBJECTIVE

The relationship between the Congress and the Executive Branch has been characterized by Arthur Schlesinger as, "one of the abiding mysteries of the American system of government." In developing this thought, Schlesinger further contends that the complexity surrounding this relationship has not come about by chance -- or by mistake. The founding fathers, in drafting the Constitution, purposely provided only a general framework and not a specific definition of the intended relations between the Congress and the President. Their intention being to let time and experience mold the relationship as most appropriate to fit the needs of our country [Ref. 25]. This position, portraying an imprecise and incomplete definition of responsibilities, runs directly counter to the text book descriptions of the Constitutional separation of powers. But in truth, our government actually does operate, not as a government of separated powers, but, as described by Richard Neustadt, "as a government of separated institutions sharing powers."

At no time is the relationship between the Congress and the Executive Branch less clear than during the process of determining the optimum allocation of our defense resources. The Constitutional intent of establishing Congress as "keeper of the purse" is made reasonably clear with the following provisions:



No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; the Congress shall have power to raise and support Armies.

However, the ensuing process, described by Schlesinger, of time and experience molding these general provisions into a set of working relationships has been far from smooth and orderly. Real control of the defense budgetary process has been a hotly contested issue since the time of the very first Federal budgets developed by Alexander Hamilton. At various times throughout our history, there have been dramatic shifts in budgetary control, back and forth between the Congress and the Executive Branch. Many students of this process feel that such a shift is presently taking place with the Congress making a partially successful attempt at regaining some of the power relinquished to a strong Executive during the 1960's and early 1970's [Ref. 18].

In an environment as described above, it would seem axiomatic that an Executive agency whose very life blood, its budget, requires substantial Congressional authorization must extend every possible effort to understand the relationships at work. The recognition of the complexity and importance of this problem initially focused this researcher's attention in this area. Coupled with a background as an employee of the Department of the Navy, an agency of the nature just described, this recognition led to a desire to provide an improved understanding of the Navy's relationship with Congress. A specific interest in the

management of Naval Aviation weapon system programs then resulted in the foundation of the following detailed objective for this research study effort -- to characterize the current Congressional budgetary climate for Naval Aviation. In this study, the term "budgetary climate" is intended to encompass the overall treatment accorded the Navy's budget in Congress, culminating in the changes actually made to the requested budget.

B. THE APPROACH

Previous studies in this area have tended to concentrate on examining the general relationship between Congress and the Executive and have been most interested in trying to define the motivations behind Congressional decision-making. The research approaches most often employed have been the detailed study of a specific case over time or the subjective interview and survey question technique.

The primary interest in this study, however, is not to investigate Congressional motivations, but rather to examine the results of the Navy's interactions with Congress during the budgetary process. The approach selected for this effort is a simple, more analytical effort aimed at measuring key indicators of Congressional influence on the Navy's budget. In order to provide some perspective for viewing the results of these measurements, the same key indicators will also be measured for Air Force Tactical weapon system programs considered comparable to the Naval Aviation programs.

The results thus obtained will then be analyzed and compared with the objective of providing a description of the current Congressional climate for Naval Aviation programs.

For reasons discussed in Chapter III, this study will be confined to the authorization phases of the budgets for Fiscal Year (FY) 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980. The indicators of Congressional behavior selected for measurement were:

- (1) the questions asked of defense witnesses during the Hearings
- (2) the funding adjustments recommended by the committees
- (3) the rationale provided for committee decisions

Again as described in Chapter III, this study will be limited to consideration of the Procurement and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation categories only.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

The chapter immediately following provides background information describing the approach selected and the results obtained in this study. Chapter III defines the approach followed in analyzing the three previously cited key indicators of Congressional behavior. This is followed by a presentation of the most significant findings in Chapter IV. Chapter V reviews these findings and provides the conclusions. Several appendices with sample worksheets, research formats and compilations of raw data are also attached.

II. BACKGROUND

The sections to follow in this chapter are intended to provide the reader with sufficient background knowledge to understand the focus of this study and to appreciate the complexity of the relationship between Congress and the Executive Branch. The first section will very briefly outline the role established for the Congress in the Constitution as the "keeper of the purse." The second section will then summarize the circumstances and events surrounding those times in our history when control of the budgetary process has transferred between the Congress and the Executive. The final section of this chapter will provide a description of the current relationship between Congress and the Executive. This will be accomplished by reviewing those recent research efforts whose approaches and results most influenced the directions taken in this study.

A. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY ROLE AS ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION

The functions and responsibilities of Congress have been grouped in many different categories by various students of the political system. Most would agree, however, that all of the primary Congressional functions are in some way included in the following:

- (1) Making of laws
- (2) Checking on the administration

(3) Informing the public

(4) Representing constituent interests

This study, with its stated objective of describing the budgetary climate for the Navy, will focus on the first of these functions -- the creation of legislation. Specifically, because of this budgetary orientation, the funds authorization legislative process will receive concentrated attention.

It should be noted here that the budget process often plays an important part in Congress' execution of its responsibilities in its other functions -- particularly when overseeing the administration and representing constituent interests. This creates a set of interesting implications which will be addressed in the following chapter.

The responsibility of Congress in the budgetary process, often referred to as the "power of the purse," is clearly established in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution as follows:

The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States;

Congressional responsibility in the area of the Defense budget, in particular, is further defined later in this same section of the Constitution by the following:

[The Congress shall have power]
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces;

Undoubtedly, the framers of our Constitution modeled this assignment of Congressional spending power after the experience of the English Parliament. The Parliament secured its authority over the spending power because of the nature of the responsibilities of the legislative branch of the Government. The legislator, as a direct representative of the people, naturally would protect the interests of those he represented and in particular, he would be very much concerned with the level of taxation. It is interesting to note that even though the writing of the Constitution created significant new powers for the Executive and signaled the end of the legislative government originally created by the Articles of Confederation, the "power of the purse" remained securely with the Congress.

B. THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

At the time of the writing of the Constitution, this assignment of the "power of the purse" responsibility to Congress was considered a major delegation of power. In the Federalist Papers, The Federalist No. 58, Alexander Hamilton predicted:

This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people. [Ref. 12, p. 3]

Despite the potential for power associated with this assignment of responsibility, effective utilization of this power through actual control of the budget process, did not occur automatically for Congress. As will be evident from the brief review of budget history to follow, real control of the budgetary process has made periodic fluctuations between the Congress and the Executive branch. This review, highlighting only the most significant events, will provide a perspective which will prove helpful in understanding the current budgeting activities.

The first Federal budgets were developed, starting in 1789, by the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton believed that the Executive Branch should control the process of determining which of the competing needs within the country would receive the funds. His system of four broadly-based appropriations in the entire budget gave the Executive a great deal of latitude - the kind of latitude modern-day managers in DoD can only dream about.

Within a few years, Congress established a Ways and Means Committee to review Hamilton's budgets in more detail. Soon thereafter, Hamilton began to receive a number of Congressional demands for information to substantiate his budget requests. As if to set the tone for Executive/Congressional budgetary relations for the next 200-year period, Hamilton provided the required information, but continued to transfer funds, as he deemed necessary, between line items without Congressional approval [Ref. 4, p. 12].

Later strengthening of the Ways and Means Committee and establishment of the Military and Naval Affairs Committees (later to become the Armed Services Committees) provided the Congress with general control of the defense budgets during most of the 1800's and the early 1900's. Probably just as important during this time was the fact that there was no central driving force for financial planning within the Executive. Also the War and Navy Departments were not at all prepared or equipped to play budgetary decision-making roles. Congress exhibited their control and interest in detailed financial planning by vastly increasing the number of appropriation line items. For example, in the 1878 budget, the appropriation for the U.S. Military Academy totaled approximately \$200,000 and was made up of some 40 line items as detailed as the following:

For Department of Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry Tactics, namely [Ref. 7, p. 2 as cited in Ref. 22, p. 6]

- (1) Tan-bark for riding hall and gymnasium - \$300.
- (2) Repairing camp stools and tents - \$50.
- (3) Stationary for use of instructors - \$100.
- (4) Text books - \$20.

Starting in the early 1900's, the Executive Branch began to become more interested and capable of participating in the budget process. Probably as important as this emergence of interest within the Executive Branch, was the complete decentralization of the Congressional appropriation process.

Eighteen committees had the power to recommend appropriations, but no one looked at the allocation as a whole. This was viewed as a significant problem by many within Congress as well as many within the growing Executive Departments. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was enacted as an attempt to correct this situation.

One of the key provisions of the 1921 Act provided for the President to formulate and present a comprehensive executive budget to the Congress. Another important provision of this Act established the Bureau of the Budget (later to become the Office of Management and Budget) to assist the President with his new tasks. Although little impact was immediately evidenced from these changes, this legislation did mark a significant turning point and the beginning of a definite shift in power toward the Executive Branch.

During the next 40 years, Congress periodically produced legislative measures aimed at regaining some of the control over the budgetary process that they had previously enjoyed. These efforts were largely unsuccessful and the power of the purse increasingly shifted toward the President and his staffs. With the coming of the McNamara-guided Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1960's, there is little question of who controlled the allocation of defense resources. The 1960's undoubtedly marked the high point of Executive influence over the budgetary process since the time of Alexander Hamilton.

C. CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND DOD

In order to complete this brief background of Congressional/Executive relations, the section to follow will summarize the current situation by describing some of the most significant, recent research efforts and publications in this area. The purpose here is not to attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the available literature, but rather to cite those particular efforts that most influenced the design and conduct of this study.

One interesting area of research is centered on the question of whether Congress makes its decision from an incremental, fiscal basis or from a broader based, policy-making or programmatic viewpoint. This question has grown out of a number of research efforts conducted/published in the 1960's including:

- (1) Huntington's description of defense policy issues as "structural" or "strategic" [Ref. 14].
- (2) Fenno's findings that non-defense agencies were primarily concerned with programmatic issues while related Congressional decisions were made more on a fiscal basis [Ref. 8].
- (3) Wildavsky's findings that the non-defense committees of Congress processed their portions of the budget in an incremental, fiscal approach with little concern to the ultimate desirability of the program [Ref. 41].

Kanter used the foregoing as a starting point to study Congress's processing of the defense budget from 1960 to 1970 [Ref. 16]. He found that while Congressional treatment of the DoD budget from a whole was incremental, when disaggregated into its appropriation categories, the budget was reviewed with more of a programmatic orientation. Kanter concluded that at the budget category level, Congress was indeed interested in influencing defense policy and in helping to determine the shape of the programs. Korb followed Kanter's work with a study of the Congressional influence on the major appropriation categories of DoD's budget from 1962 to 1973 [Ref. 17]. His findings contradicted those of Kanter as he concluded that the programmatic adjustments did not truly shape programs since the original program was just restored in later years.

These works, in turn, inspired several research efforts at the Naval Postgraduate School that used the content analysis technique to analyze committee reports for indications of fiscal or programmatic decision-making. Lukenas investigated the House Appropriations Committee decisions and found that during the 1970 through 1973 budget cycles, most of this committee's decisions were fiscal in nature [Ref. 20]. From a study of the decisions made by the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1968 through FY 1974 budgets, Blackmon concluded that while the Committee made a majority of its decisions on a fiscal basis, programmatic decision-making was becoming increasingly important [Ref. 3]. Camp

used the content analysis technique to study the decisions made by both the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on the FY 76 and FY 77 budgets, the first two years to be affected by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 [Ref. 4]. He found that the trend of increasing programmatic decision-making had continued and that the committees, taken as a unit, made a majority of their decisions from a programmatic basis.

This line of research influenced this researcher to include in this study an analysis of the fiscal/programmatic behavior of the authorization committees in the FY 78, FY 79 and FY 80 budgets. This provided one key measure for comparing the Congressional treatment of Navy and Air Force programs.

A second line of existing research that influenced the design of this study evolved from Laurance's article that suggested a systemic approach for studying the changing role of Congress in defense policy [Ref. 18]. The suggested system was built on a set of inputs, the conversion of these inputs by certain internal processes and a group of measurable outputs or impacts on the external system. Through a review of various studies that measured several of these key indicators, Laurance concluded that Congress was increasingly assuming a policy making role in the defense budget process. This conclusion suggested the need for an updating to reflect the current situation. This work and the efforts of

Sharkansky in evaluating the relationship between a House Appropriations Subcommittee and four of its client agencies [Ref. 26] resulted in the decision to include in this study an analysis of the questions asked of defense witnesses during the budget Hearings. In Laurance's terms, these Hearing questions are one of the important inputs into the budgetary process. Laurance's article also suggested the measurement of one of the important conversion processes -- i.e., the actual budget adjustments recommended by the committees.

A final area of interest that shaped the approach taken in this study is represented by numerous recent articles concerned with the increase of Congressional micromanagement of the defense agencies [Refs. 1, 11, 19, 21 and 24]. Most of these articles argue from DoD's viewpoint that Congress is wasting its time and energies making program decisions and involving itself in program details that rightfully belong to DoD. The allegation is that this occurs while problems more suited for Congressional involvement are ignored. The Congressional reply to this criticism has generally been that the micromanagement should be viewed as assistance and is only applied when necessary -- i.e., when the DoD management has been inadequate [Refs. 5 and 15]. The articles on both sides of this issue have generally been based on non-analytical arguments. Case studies have also been used to show the degree that Congress has become involved with certain weapon system programs over time.

Again these studies have generally been subjective in nature with emphasis on the personal interview technique [Ref. 22].

The focus of this literature on the micromanagement issue and the previous studies indicating an increasing Congressional interest in shaping defense policy influenced the decision to investigate micromanagement in this study. As described in Chapter III, a typology was devised that was designed to measure the degree of micromanagement existing in questions asked during authorization hearings. This typology was then used to measure the degree of micromanagement contained in the Hearings before two authorization sub-committees reviewing the FY 78 and FY 79 budgets. This provided another measure for comparing the treatment of Navy and Air Force programs. When combined with the previously described measures -- the fiscal/programmatic decision making analysis and the recommended funding adjustments -- a means had finally been devised for describing the overall Congressional climate for Naval Aviation programs.

III. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS

A. GENERAL APPROACH AND LIMITATIONS

As was established in the introductory chapter, the primary purpose of this thesis is to characterize the current budgetary climate for Naval Aviation programs within Congress. Naval Aviation programs were selected because of the researcher's work background and interest. To provide a benchmark for understanding the Congressional climate, it was decided to compare all findings for Naval Aviation programs with the treatment accorded similar Air Force Tactical Aviation programs. The general technique selected to provide this characterization was to measure three key indicators involved in the authorization portion of the Congressional budget process. These indicators were: (1) the questions asked of defense witnesses during the authorization hearings, (2) the actual level of funding adjustments recommended by the authorization committees, and (3) the reasons given for these committee recommendations.

This approach created the need for the introduction of several limitations and simplifying assumptions. The first of these was the consideration of only those programs within the Air Force budget that were comparable to Naval Aviation programs from the standpoint of mission area or objective. This limitation will be described in more detail as each measurement indicator is analyzed in the sections to follow.

In general, however, this limitation resulted in ignoring strategic Air Force programs and any joint service programs where the value of the indicator being measured could not be assigned specifically to either service.

The authorization portion of the Congressional budgetary process was selected for this study because a review of the existing literature indicates that most researchers feel that the military authorizing committees have the greatest potential for influencing defense programs and policy [Ref. 3, p. 16]. Other researchers would disagree with this position and particularly in the area of non-defense matters, would support the position that the Appropriations Committees are the most influential and powerful Congressional participants in the budgetary process [Ref. 8, p. 1 as cited in Ref. 20, p. 8]. However, it is generally conceded that such changes to the budget process as the reporting deadline dates and the compressed hearing schedules introduced by the 1974 Impoundment Control Act have tended to make the authorizing legislation the primary vehicle for shaping defense policy and for overseeing DoD [Ref. 39, p. 50].

The sections of the Defense Budget selected for this analysis were the budget categories Title I, Procurement and Title II, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). This decision was based on the findings of both Kanter and Korb who concluded that Congress concentrates its energies in the Procurement and RDT&E areas for one or more of the following reasons [Ref. 16, pp. 134-136, and Ref. 17, p. 60]:

- (1) Congress tries to cope with the complexity of the budget request by concentrating on the changes made from the previous year's budget and typically, most changes are made in the Procurement and RDT&E categories.
- (2) Congress can best apply its alleged incremental budget review philosophy to these categories because they can most easily be disaggregated into individual programs.
- (3) Procurement and RDT&E budget requests form the heart of national security and in trying to shape defense policy, Congress may purposely select these categories for their attention.
- (4) The Procurement and RDT&E categories may offer the most politically expedient areas in which changes can be made. Personnel removed from the payroll directly affect voting constituencies and closed bases and facilities seldom re-open.

Whatever reasons Congress has for emphasizing the Procurement and RDT&E budget categories, it was apparent that this study of Congressional/Executive relations should itself be concentrated in this area.

The final general limitation imposed on this study was the consideration of only the FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980 Budgets. This limitation resulted from a desire to characterize the current Congressional climate rather than to

investigate trends. The deficiency of this approach is that it provides a "snap shot" in time only, with results that are highly susceptible to obsolescence. This obsolescence can occur very easily as a result of changes in key personnel involved in the process, general economic conditions and the world political situation. Nevertheless, the results do have some continuing validity despite the concentration in three fiscal years and can serve as a point of comparison for future analyses.

The following sections will describe the specific analytical approaches that were followed for measurement of each of the three selected indicators.

B. HEARING QUESTIONS

1. Methodology

The questions asked of USN and USAF witnesses during the Authorization Hearings before both the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) provided the data for the first key indicator to be measured in this study. To investigate the DoD's allegations of increasing Congressional micromanagement, it was decided to first record and compare the frequency of questions in certain subject areas for the Navy and Air Force. In keeping with the general approach established in the previous section, only Naval Aviation and comparable Air Force Tactical Air weapon system programs were analyzed. This led to the use of the following source documents for this portion of the study:

- a. HASC Hearings on Military Posture, Part 2, Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, etc. - Title I [Ref. 27 for FY 78 and Ref. 28 for FY 79].
- b. SASC Hearings, Parts 6 and 7 before the TACAIR Subcommittee [Ref. 33 for FY 78 and Ref. 34 for FY 79].

The questions included in this part of the analysis were limited to the FY 1978 and FY 1979 Budget Hearings because the corresponding source documents for the FY 1980 Hearings were not available at the time of this report. Normally, the printed Hearing documents become available in subscriber libraries in the mid-June to mid-July timeframe. This, unfortunately, was not the case for the FY 1980 Hearings.

The working definition of a "question" utilized for this study corresponded to Sharkansky's concept of any unit of discourse that included one distinct inquiry [Ref. 26, p. 624]. In addition, statements not formulated or punctuated as questions were considered to be "questions" if they elicited replies from the witnesses.

Typically, the primary witnesses for each service made formal presentations of all their programs in the Tactical Aviation mission area and then each weapon system program in turn, was presented in more detail. For the programs considered here, the primary service witness was generally at the Deputy Chief of Staff level for the Air Force and at the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations level for

the Navy. Questions were usually asked by the committee members and the staffs during and immediately following each individual program presentation. However, particularly on controversial issues, questions on certain programs were sprinkled throughout the Hearings. All of these questions were included in this analysis, as were those questions that only requested written replies for the record.

2. Development of the Analytical Framework

The first step taken in developing the framework for use in this portion of the study was to record every question asked on three randomly selected USAF programs and three randomly selected USN programs during both the FY 1978 and FY 1979 Hearings. This involved a total of some 630 questions. These questions were studied for subject matter and eventually classified into the following five subject categories:

- a. Cost/Funding -- Questions included in this category dealt with the program funding structure, cost of the weapon system, cost effectiveness, cost of a particular modification or subprogram, cost control measures and service funding levels.
- b. Force Structure -- This subject category was defined by all those questions dealing with the inventory of a particular system, the inventory requirements, population or inventory interfaces

between systems and the mix of the total force.

- c. Design/Performance -- This category was made up of all questions concerned with the design and performance characteristics of the weapon systems or their components. Inquiries into the techniques for operational employment and the capability of meeting mission requirements were also included in this category.
- d. Program Management -- Inquiries involving the manner in which the program was being directed, how the decisions were being made, the test results, the status of the program, the possibility of multi-service cooperation and the relationship to Congressional direction constituted the development of this category.
- e. Other -- Any questions not falling into the already established categories. (This, at first, may appear to be too broad a category to allow for a meaningful analysis, but in fact, fewer than 5% of the questions were placed in this category.)

The second step of this process of developing an analytical framework involved physically arranging all of the questions in each subject category in relative order with respect to the variable -- "level of detail." This variable was selected after a careful study of the main

themes of concern of each question and after a detailed review of the available literature providing DoD's descriptions of Congressional micromanagement [Refs. 1, 5, 11, 19, 21 and 24]. This "level of detail" variable emerged from this review as the best measurable representation of the concept of micromanagement. As an example of the process employed in this step, the ordered list of questions that was developed for the Program Management subject category is attached as Appendix A. This list starts with the most detailed or specific management question and extends to the most general or overview type of question that was asked. Similar lists were developed for each subject category.

Not every question that was recorded in the Program Management category is included in Appendix A for reasons of space in this report. However, all "levels of detail" that were identified in this category are represented. That effort constituted the third step in developing the analytical framework. To create a workable typology, various distinct "levels of detail" existing in each ordered list of questions were identified and representative questions, typical of each level, were developed. The identified "levels of detail" and the corresponding "typical questions" are included in Appendix B for the four main subject categories. (Questions in the "Other" category were not included in this process.)

The final step in developing this framework for analysis required the identification of the "levels of detail" considered to represent Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget. Again, after study of the now developed "typical questions" and the existing literature describing the Defense Department's concept of micromanagement, the following working definition was formulated:

- a. All questions in the subject categories of Cost/Funding and Force Structure fall within Congress's area of responsibility, regardless of their "level of detail," and thus, for this study were considered to not be micromanagement.
- b. Questions in the Design/Performance category identified in the Appendix B "levels of detail" lists as being in Levels I-III were considered to represent micromanagement. Answers to these questions were assessed as not required for Congress to fulfill its responsibilities in the budget process. The "typical questions" of these levels included: Why don't you design it like this? What is the particular design problem? How much fuel does it carry? How fast can it fly? How is the system employed in the operational environment?
- c. Design/Performance questions at Levels IV and V were considered to not be micromanagement.

- d. Program Management questions in Levels I-IV were considered representative of Congressional micromanagement. The "typical questions" of these levels included: Shouldn't the program be managed this way? Will you have competition? Why are these components being procured as Contractor Furnished Equipment instead of Government Furnished? Who in DoD made this decision? Will you have a DSARC? Have you properly planned for the support elements of the program? What are the results of this test? (See Appendix B for the remaining "typical questions.")
- e. Program Management questions at Levels V-X were considered to not be micromanagement.
- f. All questions in the Other category were considered to not be micromanagement.

Thus, the working definition for questions representing Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget became:

<u>MICROMANAGEMENT</u>	<u>NOT MICROMANAGEMENT</u>
Design/Performance -- Levels I-III	All Cost/Funding and Force Structure
Program Management -- Levels I-IV	Design/Performance -- Levels IV and V
	Program Management -- Levels V through X
	All Other

As was discussed in the Background Chapter, Congress has responsibility for a number of functions in addition to

the authorization of budget legislation task that is of primary importance to this study. Further, it was indicated that at times, Congress used the occasion of budgetary decisions to act as overseer of the administration and as representative of constituent interests. Considering the preceding definition of micromanagement, one realizes that questions that would be considered to be inappropriate micromanagement when asked from the budgetary standpoint, might be totally appropriate for a Congressman performing in his other capacities. In fact, this attention to detail, i.e., micromanagement, may be the only effective means available for a Congressman to fulfill his oversight and representative responsibilities.

In reviewing the questions asked of DoD witnesses in this light, it appears quite likely that Congressmen asking questions delving into the details of the management of a program, may very well be doing so with the intention of checking administrative compliance with legislative guidance. Likewise, the Congressman asking detailed questions concerning the design characteristics of a system may actually be attempting to protect the interests of a contractor from his home district. Whatever may have motivated the Congressman to ask these questions during the Hearings, the result or impact on the service is micromanagement. Since, as previously stipulated, this study is most interested in describing the results of the Navy's interactions with Congress,

the above working definition of micromanagement was employed without further consideration of Congressional motivations.

With this, the framework for analysis was considered completed and the emphasis was then applied to using this technique to analyze the questions asked during the Hearings.

3. The Analysis

Using the framework described in the preceding section and the source documents listed in Section 1. Methodology, all questions asked in the FY 1978 and FY 1979 Hearings on Tactical Aviation weapon system programs were analyzed and categorized. Inspection of a sample worksheet, included in this report as Appendix C, will make the mechanics of this process obvious. A grand total of some 3,100 questions were analyzed and categorized in this manner. The results of this effort are discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this report.

C. FUNDING ADJUSTMENTS

1. Methodology

The second indicator, analyzed as part of this effort to characterize the overall Congressional climate for Naval Aviation programs, was based on the HASC and SASC recommended funding adjustments to DoD's budget requests of FY's 1978, 1979 and 1980. The basic source documents for this information were the House and Senate Armed Services Committee Reports on the Department of Defense Authorization Act for the various fiscal years [Refs. 29 through 31 and Refs. 35 through 37].

As established in Section A, GENERAL APPROACH of this Chapter, only the adjustments to the Procurement and RDT&E budget categories and only USN and USAF weapon system programs in the Tactical Aviation mission areas were considered in this analysis. In certain limited instances, it was impossible to determine, with the information available, the exact level of the DoD requests. This was particularly true in those areas where the budget request for a common line item, e.g., RDT&E Aircraft Flight Test Support, was spread across several weapon system programs. In all cases, it was attempted to assign all costs associated with a program to that particular program. Information received from telephone conversations with the Naval Air Systems Command Comptroller were of great assistance in this area.

2. The Analysis

Initially, the funding adjustments were calculated and recorded by: (1) budget category, (2) service, (3) fiscal year and (4) by House of Congress making the adjustment. These adjustments were then totaled and displayed in various ways to aid in the analysis.

The adjustments themselves were also calculated in two different ways. First, the NET CHANGE to the DoD budget request (positive or negative) was calculated. The NET CHANGE as a percentage of the original request was also calculated. The second category of adjustment to be calculated and recorded was the ABSOLUTE CHANGE to the budget

request, i.e., the additions and subtractions taken together. This ABSOLUTE CHANGE then was calculated as a percentage of the original request to provide the mean absolute difference measure described by Korb [Ref. 17, p. 56].

The ABSOLUTE CHANGE measure was considered to be the better indicator of total Congressional involvement or activity in the budget process, whereas the NET CHANGE indicated the Congressional value placed on the particular programs undergoing consideration. Both of these measures are presented in detail in Chapter IV of this report.

D. REASONS GIVEN FOR COMMITTEE DECISIONS

1. Methodology

The third and final indicator selected for analysis in this study involved the reasons given by the HASC and SASC for making their recommended program funding adjustments. The dimension chosen to be measured was the Congressional decision-making hypothesis -- "fiscal" versus "programmatic" -- which has been the subject of several other studies as described in Chapter II. In particular, the works of Blackmon [Ref. 3] and Camp [Ref. 4] were used to guide the analytical methodology of categorizing the reasons given for committee decisions as either being "fiscal" or "programmatic" in nature.

The research technique of content analysis was employed here to classify each committee decision based on the success of this method in these earlier studies, and

particularly because of Sharkansky's finding that it was a valid tool to devise indexes of committee behavior toward their client agencies [Ref. 26, p. 628]. Category definition, which is critical to the validity of the content analysis technique, was based heavily on the efforts of Camp [Ref. 4]. With some small exceptions, the categories used in this study were identical to the categories devised, tested and validated by Camp [Ref. 4, pp. 48-54]. The categories used follow:

a. Fiscal Category

Committee decisions placed in this category were those primarily concerned with the level of Defense spending not overall Defense policy or program composition. Actions in this category were focused on eliminating perceived waste or inefficiency and were evidenced by percentage cuts or "across-the-board" reductions.

(1) Cost

This sub-category included the committee decisions concerned with cost effectiveness, cost growth, cost overruns and expenditures.

(2) Improper Request

Committee concerns over the need for the funds at the time or in the particular appropriation requested were reflected in this sub-category.

(3) Program Management

Decisions that cited cost inefficiencies and waste associated with the way the program or procurement was managed were included here.

b. Programmatic Category

Decisions reflecting the committee's interest in addressing the budget in policy terms with the intent of influencing the shape or composition of the programs appeared in this category. These decisions demonstrated less committee concern with total spending and more concern with the adequacy of the defense posture, the make-up of the force, the type of hardware being procured and the management of the program.

(1) Force Structure

This subcategory included the committee decisions that involved the level and composition of the force, the inventory of a certain system and its readiness and effectiveness.

(2) Force Modernization

Committee decisions involving the replacement of obsolete systems were placed in this category.

(3) Developmental

Decisions dealing with scheduling, testing, technical problems and program slippages made up this category.

(4) Planning/Justification

In this category were placed the committee decisions that questioned the justification of the need for the particular system. Mission requirements were also suspect.

(5) Congressional Policy

This category contained all decisions that cited compliance with Congressional directive or policy as the driving factor.

c. Other Category

When the decision did not fall into any of the foregoing categories or in those cases where it was impossible to determine the reason or the committee's intentions, the decision was included in this category. Most decisions were able to be placed in either a "Fiscal" or "Programmatic" category -- less than 5% had to be included in this "Other" category.

Again, conforming with the GENERAL APPROACH section of this Chapter, only those committee decisions that:

(1) dealt with USN and USAF weapon system programs in the Tactical Aviation mission area, and (2) were within the Procurement and RDT&E budget categories were considered. The source documents for the committee decisions were the House and Senate Armed Services Committee Reports on the Department of Defense Authorization Act [Refs. 29 through 31 and Refs. 35 through 37]. The budgets analyzed were for FY's 1978, 1979 and 1980.

2. The Analysis

The first step in this process was to record each committee decision of interest on worksheets. A sample worksheet is included in this report as Appendix D. These

worksheets were separated initially by budget category (Procurement or RDT&E), by committee (HASC or SASC), by fiscal year (FY 78, FY 79 or FY 80) and by service (USN or USAF). A total of 186 decisions were recorded in this manner.

The next step in the analysis was to review each of the committee decisions in great detail, note key words and phrases, and categorize it into one of the sub-categories defined in the previous section. Finally, all decisions were coded into the proper major category -- i.e., "Fiscal," "Programmatic" or "Other" -- as defined in the previous section. The results of this effort are described in detail in Chapter IV.

IV. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The results of the analyses conducted as described in Chapter III will be summarized in the sections to follow. The results of each major indicator measured will be reported separately, while the relationships between these indicators will be discussed in Chapter V, CONCLUSIONS.

A. HEARING QUESTIONS

As described in the previous chapter, the intent of this first indicator was to categorize, by subject, the questions asked of USN and USAF witnesses during the budget hearings. The subject categories devised were: 1) Funding/Cost, 2) Force Structure, (3) Design/Performance, 4) Program Management and 5) Other. The categories of Design/Performance and Program Management were further sub-divided based upon the "level of detail" contained in the inquiry. The lower levels or more detailed inquiries were taken to represent efforts at Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget. The FY 1978 and FY 1979 Hearings before the Tactical Air Subcommittee of the SASC and before the full HASC provided the subject matter for this analysis. All questions asked regarding USN and USAF weapon system programs in the Tactical Aviation Mission area were categorized and the results recorded by service, by fiscal year and by the committee asking the question. The overall results obtained from this

effort are shown in the Tables that follow -- Table I for the questions asked of the Navy and Table II for the Air Force.

USN QUESTIONS

Number of Questions Asked in Each Subject Category

Subject Category	FY 1978		FY 1979		Total
	SASC	HASC	SASC	HASC	
Funding/Cost	92	51	89	59	291
Force Structure	113	27	72	39	251
Design/Performance					
- Micromgt.	68	41	62	21	192
- Non Micromgt.	101	65	105	34	305
Program Mgt.					
- Micromgt.	57	106	39	36	238
- Non Micromgt.	75	102	58	61	296
Other	17	17	18	9	61

Table I

USAF QUESTIONS

Number of Questions Asked in Each Subject Category

Subject Category	FY 1978		FY 1979		Total
	SASC	HASC	SASC	HASC	
Funding/Cost	111	145	76	45	381
Force Structure	16	17	20	2	55
Design/Performance					
- Micromgt.	122	79	76	21	298
- Non Micromgt.	83	90	79	5	257
Program Mgt.					
- Micromgt.	45	64	65	13	187
- Non Micromgt.	112	72	78	41	303
Other	23	14	6	5	48

Table II

In percentage terms and ignoring (for the moment) the differences between committees, this data appears as shown in Tables III and IV.

USN QUESTIONS

% of Total Questions Asked in Each Fiscal Year

Subject Category	FY 1978	FY 1979	Average
Funding/Cost	15%	21%	18%
Force Structure	15%	16%	15%
Design/Performance			
- Micromgt.	12%	12%	12%
- Non Micromgt.	18%	20%	19%
Program Mgt.			
- Micromgt.	17%	11%	15%
- Non Micromgt.	19%	17%	18%
Other	4%	3%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table III

USAF QUESTIONS

% of Total Questions Asked in Each Fiscal Year

Subject Category	FY 1978	FY 1979	Average
Funding/Cost	26%	23%	25%
Force Structure	3%	4%	4%
Design/Performance			
- Micromgt.	20%	18%	19%
- Non Micromgt.	17%	16%	17%
Program Mgt.			
- Micromgt.	11%	15%	12%
- Non Micromgt.	19%	22%	20%
Other	4%	2%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table IV

Inspection of these results provides a number of interesting findings including:

1. The questions asked of both services were remarkably consistent from the FY 1978 Hearings to the FY 1979 Hearings.

2. The largest changes from one year to the next occurred for both services in the "Funding/Cost" category and in the "MICRO management" level of the "Program Management" category. The percentage of "Funding/Cost" questions increased for the Navy and decreased for the Air Force from FY 78 to FY 79. This trend was just reversed for "MICRO" questions in the "Program Management" category.

3. Ignoring the "MICRO management" subdivisions, the greatest percentage of questions to both services were in the "Design/Performance" and "Program Management" categories.

4. The Air Force was asked more questions than the Navy in the "Funding/Cost" category with the reverse occurring in the "Force Structure" category.

Ignoring again the "MICRO management" subdivisions, these results for subject category classification are best shown by the following Figure 1.

PERCENTAGE OF QUESTIONS IN EACH SUBJECT AREA

FY 1978 & FY 1979




Figure 1

In Chapter III, a working definition or representation of Congressional micromanagement of the defense budget was developed as the "high level of detail" questions asked in the two subject categories -- "Design/Performance" and "Program Management." Manipulation of the foregoing data to reflect this definition provides the results shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2

It is evident that in both years included in this portion of the study, a higher percentage of the questions asked of the Air Force fit the micromanagement definition. This was especially true in FY 1979 when 33% of the total questions asked of the Air Force, as compared to 23% for the Navy, were categorized as micromanagement. From FY 1978 to FY 1979 the micromanagement percentage decreased significantly for the Navy and increased slightly for the Air Force.

Up to this point, the influence of the committee asking the question has been largely disregarded. If the results obtained from the two fiscal year budgets are combined, the subject category breakdowns (in percentage terms) by committee appear as shown in Tables V and VI.

USN QUESTIONS% of Total Questions Asked By Each Committee

Subject Category	SASC	HASC
Funding/Cost	19%	16%
Force Structure	19%	10%
Design/Performance		
- Micromgt.	13%	9%
- Non Micromgt.	21%	15%
Program Mgt.		
- Micromgt.	10%	21%
- Non Micromgt.	14%	24%
Other	4%	5%
Total	100%	100%

Table V

USAF QUESTIONS% of Total Questions Asked By Each Committee

Subject Category	SASC	HASC
Funding/Cost	21%	31%
Force Structure	4%	3%
Design/Performance		
- Micromgt.	22%	16%
- Non Micromgt.	18%	15%
Program Mgt.		
- Micromgt.	12%	12%
- Non Micromgt.	21%	18%
Other	2%	5%
Total	100%	100%

Table VI

Table V indicates that the SASC TACAIR Subcommittee asked the Navy a higher percentage of questions in the "Funding/Cost," "Force Structure" and "Design/Performance" subject categories than the full HASC did. This situation was reversed with questions in the "Program Management" category. When questioning the Air Force, the SASC again asked a higher percentage of questions in the Design/Performance category than the HASC did, as shown in Table VI. But counter to the Navy results, the HASC exceeded the SASC in the "Funding/Cost" category while the SASC exceeded the HASC in the "Program Management" category. For the Air Force, there was not a significant difference between the two committees in the "Force Structure" category.

Using the micromanagement definition described earlier, the data of Table V and Table VI is transformed into Figure 3 below.




Figure 3

From Figure 3 it appears that a significantly higher percentage of the questions asked of the Air Force by the SASC TACAIR Subcommittee fit the working definition of micromanagement. However, in the case of the HASC, there is little distinction between the questions asked of the Navy and those of the Air Force.

It should be noted here that it was originally anticipated that there would be substantial differences in the results obtained for the two committees -- differences associated more with the structure of the committees than with the influence of the particular service. This was expected largely because the questions taken from the SASC Hearings were generated by a separate subcommittee for Tactical Aviation, whereas the HASC does not have a directly comparable, separate subcommittee and the questions selected for analysis were generated by the full HASC. This structural difference results in a number of factors that have the potential for influencing the results obtained. These factors include:

- (1) the size, composition and expertise of the staffs
- (2) the position of the committee within the approval chain
- (3) the interests, concerns and primary responsibilities of the committee members

While these factors are certainly real and undoubtedly had some influence on the results obtained in this study, the data indicate that the service in question was also a

major contributing factor. As can be seen from Figure 3, if the results obtained for the services are averaged together for each committee, there ends up being very little difference between the two committees. In fact, the greatest differences in the percentage of micromanagement questions asked occur not from committee to committee for a given service, but rather between the Navy and the Air Force for questions asked by one committee -- the SASC. Thus, the influences from the different structures of the two committees were not as strong as originally anticipated.

B. FUNDING ADJUSTMENTS

Adjustments to the DoD budget request, as recommended by the HASC and SASC, provided the second indicator measured in this study. As discussed in Chapter III, these funding adjustments were researched and the data recorded by:

(1) service, (2) committee making the recommendation, (3) budget category and (4) by fiscal year. In addition, the recommended adjustments themselves were measured in two different ways -- i.e., as a net change to the budget request and as an absolute change.

The recording of the data in terms of these several variables allows for presentation of the findings in numerous ways depending upon one's objectives. Since the purpose of this study was to compare the Congressional treatment of Naval Aviation programs with similar Air Force programs, the findings summarized in the following sections will emphasize

this area. The first section will directly compare Navy and Air Force programs using both the NET CHANGES and ABSOLUTE CHANGES measures. The second section will investigate the influence of the committee making the recommendation on both the Navy and Air Force budgets, but will only use the ABSOLUTE CHANGE measure. Appendix E contains all of the data collected in tabular form and would allow for detailed analyses in terms of all the variables mentioned.

1. Comparison of Navy and Air Force Programs

- a. NET CHANGE to the Budget Request

Calculations of the NET CHANGES to DoD's budget request, as recommended by the authorization committees, revealed significant differences between the treatment accorded the Navy and Air Force budgets. Again, the NET CHANGE to the budget request equals the algebraic total of all increases and decreases recommended by the committee. It represents the level of funding the committees thought most appropriate for the service to accomplish its tasks. Figure 4 below shows the NET CHANGES recommended by the SASC for FY's 1978, 1979 and 1980.

As is evident from Figure 4, in all three fiscal years the SASC recommended a greater percentage NET CHANGE in the Navy's budget than they did for the Air Force. In FY 1978, reductions in both service's budgets were recommended, whereas, in FY's 1979 and 1980, increases were recommended. The greatest NET CHANGE recommended by the SASC was for the Navy in FY1980 -- an increase from the budget request of approximately 10%.




Figure 4

Figure 5 below provides the same information for the changes recommended by the HASC.




Figure 5

In FY's 1979 and 1980, the pattern developed in Figure 4 for the SASC also holds for the changes recommended by the HASC -- i.e., budget increases are recommended for both the Navy and Air Force, the Navy's budget is subjected to a greater percentage NET CHANGE and in FY 1980, the HASC recommended the greatest increase to the Navy's budget. However, FY 1978 presents a somewhat different picture -- a reduction is recommended for the Navy while an increase is recommended for the Air Force. Further, the percent NET CHANGE in the Navy's budget is less than that for the Air Force -- the first time this has occurred.

In order to concentrate even more on the comparison between the treatment of Naval Aviation and tactical Air Force programs, these NET CHANGES findings were taken one step further. The NET CHANGES calculated for the SASC and HASC and reported here in Figures 4 and 5 were averaged for both the Navy and Air Force and the results are shown below in Figure 6. This average value of the SASC and HASC recommended changes is labeled "CONGRESSIONAL NET CHANGE," which is considered to be a reasonable representation based upon the compromising activity (averaging out of extreme values) that occurs during the subsequent Floor and Conference Committee actions.




Figure 6

By averaging together the NET CHANGES recommended by the SASC and HASC, it becomes clear that in all three years investigated, the recommendation for the Navy is further (increased or decreased) from its original request than the recommendation for the Air Force. This is especially true in FY 1980, where a 12.6% average CONGRESSIONAL NET CHANGE (Increase) was recommended for the Navy. In all cases, the change recommended for the Air Force was less than 2% of its original request.

b. ABSOLUTE CHANGE to the Budget Request

The ABSOLUTE CHANGES recommended by the authorizing committees will be presented in this section.

The ABSOLUTE CHANGE equals the sum total of all changes recommended without regard to whether these changes were increases or decreases to the requested budget. It is a better representation of total Congressional interest or activity in establishing the budget.

Figure 7 below shows the ABSOLUTE CHANGES recommended by the SASC.




Figure 7

In each fiscal year, the SASC recommended a greater percentage ABSOLUTE CHANGE in the Navy's budget than they did in the Air Force's budget. The greatest change, as well as the greatest difference between the changes recommended for the services, occurred in FY 1980.

Figure 8 provides similar information recorded for the HASC.




Figure 8

As was the case with the NET CHANGES in Figures 4 and 5, the pattern with the SASC recommended ABSOLUTE CHANGES holds true for the HASC recommended ABSOLUTE CHANGES in FY's 1979 and 1980. Greater percentage changes are recommended for the Navy's budget. In fact, the greatest recommended change occurs in FY 1980. However, the situation is reversed in FY 1978. As was the case with the NET CHANGES, in FY 1978 the HASC recommended a much larger percentage change to the Air Force's budget than they did to the Navy's budget.

As was done in the previous section, where the NET CHANGES were reported, an average of the SASC and HASC recommended ABSOLUTE CHANGES will be presented in the following figure. Although this average value has somewhat less validity here than it did with the NET CHANGES, it still provides a reasonable representation of CONGRESSIONAL ABSOLUTE CHANGE from the authorization committees.

Again, the CONGRESSIONAL ABSOLUTE CHANGE was greatest for the Naval Aviation budgets in FY's 1979 and FY 1980 -- particularly in FY 1980 when the absolute changes recommended to the Navy's budget averaged 17% of the original request and the changes to the Air Force's budget averaged less than 6% of the original request. This result was reversed in FY 1978 when changes to the Air Force's budget exceeded those recommended to the Navy's budget. However, the difference between the two services was much less in FY 1978 than it was in the succeeding two years.

CONGRESSIONAL ABSOLUTE CHANGE




Figure 9

2. Influence of the Committee

Although the primary purpose of this study was to determine the differences between Congressional treatment of Naval Aviation programs and similar Air Force programs, the manner in which the data was recorded allowed for a comparison of the treatment accorded Naval Aviation programs by the two authorizing committees -- the SASC and HASC. Likewise, the changes to the Air Force's budget recommended by

the two committees could be compared. These comparisons for the ABSOLUTE CHANGES measure are provided in Figures 10 and 11 to follow.




Figure 10

As has been notice previously, the greatest percentage changes to the Navy's budget were recommended by both committees in FY 1980 with FY 1979 close behind. In both years, the HASC recommended significantly greater ABSOLUTE CHANGES than the SASC did. This situation was reversed

in FY 1978, when both committees recommended smaller changes, but the larger of the two was recommended by the SASC rather than the HASC.

ABSOLUTE CHANGES TO USAF BUDGET




Figure 11

For the Air Force's budget, in all three fiscal years, the HASC recommended the greater (or at least equal) ABSOLUTE CHANGES, with the greatest change occurring in FY 1978. FY 1978 was the year that the least change was recommended by the HASC for the Navy's budget.

Similar analyses could also be made of the NET CHANGES recommended by the committees. In addition, the differences between the budget categories (Procurement and RDT&E) could be analyzed. However, differences attributable to these variables are of secondary interest to the main concern of this study and thus are left to some other researcher to investigate.

C. REASONS GIVEN FOR COMMITTEE DECISIONS

The third key indicator of Congressional behavior investigated in this study focused on the published rationale for the funding adjustment decisions recommended by the authorization committees during the budget process. As described in Chapter III, the variable actually measured was the "fiscal/programmatic" theme that was determined to form the basis of the committee recommendation. The data was recorded by: (1) service, (2) committee (3) budget category and (4) by fiscal year. Again, since the main thrust of this study was to investigate the differences between Congressional behavior toward Naval Aviation programs and similar Air Force programs, the findings reported here will emphasize this comparison. The first section to follow will therefore, compare the results obtained for each service by taking the HASC and SASC decisions together and also by combining the budget categories -- Procurement and RDT&E. The second section will then consider the influence of the committee making the recommendation. All of the data collected in this area is attached in Appendix F in summary form.

Those decisions placed in the "Other" category during the analysis, i.e., no particular reason could be determined for the decision, have been omitted from these findings for purposes of simplicity. Less than 5% of the total decisions were placed in this category and this was considered insignificant. It is for this reason, however, that some of the findings in the following pages do not total 100%.

1. Comparison of Navy and Air Force Programs

Figures 12 and 13 provide the results obtained for the Navy and Air Force programs for the three fiscal year budgets evaluated -- FY 1978, FY 1979 and FY 1980.




Figure 12

In each year, the HASC and SASC taken together made more of their funding adjustment decisions on the Navy's budget from a programmatic standpoint than for fiscal reasons -- i.e., the committees, while still concerned with controlling the level of spending, were even more interested in shaping the composition of Naval Aviation programs. Programmatic activity was most prevalent on the FY 1980 budget and least noticeable in 1979.

DECISIONS ON USAF PROGRAMS




Figure 13

Again in all three years, it appears that the authorizing committees made more of their budget decisions for Air Force Tactical programs on a programmatic basis rather than from a strictly fiscal concern. This was especially true in FY 1979. Figure 14 below provides a more direct comparison of the treatment of Navy and Air Force programs by counting only the programmatic decisions for the two services.

COMPARISON OF USN & USAF PROGRAMS




Figure 14

Figure 14 shows that in all three years investigated, the authorization committee's decision-making was more programmatic for the Air Force's budget than for comparable Naval

Aviation programs. However, this difference was only very significant in FY 1979. In FY 1978 and FY 1980, the committee's treatment of the Navy and Air Force budgets was remarkably similar.

2. Influence of the Committees

Attention will now be drawn to the differences in decision making behavior between the two committees of concern here -- the SASC and the HASC. As in the previous figure, the figure to follow will show the percentage of total decisions that were evaluated as programmatic for the two committees. In addition, the data collected for all three fiscal year budgets will be combined together. It was thought that there were an insufficient number of decisions in each committee to have significance if each fiscal year was considered separately. However, taken together, the results displayed below are considered valid enough to at least suggest the "fiscal/programmatic" tendencies of a committee.

The committees were remarkably consistent in making approximately 57% of their decisions on a programmatic basis for both services with one exception -- over 75% of the decisions made by the SASC on the Air Force budgets were programmatic.

COMMITTEE DECISION - MAKING
(PROGRAMMATIC CATEGORY)




Figure 15

V. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will initially present a brief review of the most significant results obtained for each of the three key indicators of Congressional behavior that formed the basis for this study. This review is summarized from the findings presented in Chapter IV. Using these results, conclusions of a more general nature, comparing Congressional treatment of Naval Aviation programs and Tactical Air Force programs, will then be offered.

A. REVIEW OF THE KEY INDICATORS MEASURED

1. Hearing Questions

a. Subject Matter

The majority of the questions asked both services were in the Design/Performance and Program Management categories. The Air Force was asked more questions related to Funding/Cost and the Navy was asked more questions pertaining to Force Structure.

b. Micromanagement

In both years, the Air Force was subjected to a higher percentage of questions classified as micromanagement. This was particularly true in FY 1979 when over 1/3 of the questions asked of the Air Force were considered to reflect micromanagement while less than 1/4 of the Navy inquiries were so categorized.

c. Committee Influence

No clear relationship was established for the subject matter of the questions asked by the two committees. However, there was a distinction between the two committees relative to their tendencies toward micromanagement -- the SASC was significantly more micromanagement oriented toward the Air Force than the Navy, whereas, the reverse was true for the HASC.

2. Funding Adjustments

a. Net Changes

In all three years, the average Congressional net budget change was greater for the Navy than it was for the Air Force. In FY 78, this net change resulted in a budget decrease for the Navy, but in FY's 79 and 80, there was a budget increase. In all years, there was a budget increase recommended for the Air Force, but the change from the originally requested amount was much less than the Navy's change.

b. Absolute Changes

In FY 79 and FY 80, the average Congressional absolute budget change was significantly greater for the Navy than it was for the Air Force. This was reversed in FY 78, although the difference between the services was much less than in the following two years.

c. Committee Influence

The HASC recommended significantly greater absolute changes in the Navy's budget in FY 79 and FY 80 than

the SASC did. In FY 78, the SASC recommended a slightly greater change than the HASC. In all three fiscal years, the HASC recommended absolute changes to the Air Force's budget that were equal to or greater than the changes recommended by the SASC.

3. Reasons Given for Committee Decisions

a. Fiscal/Programmatic Decisions

In all three years, more of the decisions on the Air Force's budgets were made from a programmatic standpoint than the decisions on the Navy's budget. For both the Navy and the Air Force, however, the majority of the decisions were programmatic.

b. Committee Influence

The SASC made significantly more programmatic decisions for the Air Force than they did for the Navy. The HASC treated both services about the same -- approximately 57% of their decisions were programmatic.

B. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In taking an overall perspective of the literature researched and the results obtained in this study and in attempting to provide an interpretation that holds some general benefit for future students of this area, one fact stands out very clearly -- Congressional decision-making is a very complex process. There are few, if any, rules or models that reliably predict how Congress will behave in given situations. Its environment is so full of influences --

its interrelations with the participating institutions so complicated -- that, at times, it seems a useless exercise to try to predict Congressional behavior. Nevertheless, some agencies, such as DoD, whose budgets require annual Congressional authorization have so much at stake in their interactions with Congress that they must make every attempt to gain some insight into the decision-making processes. They literally cannot afford a course of action other than to continually pursue any possible clue to how decisions are made. It is in this light that the following general conclusions are offered.

During the authorization Hearings investigated here, Congress tended to ask the Air Force more questions of a micromanagement nature than they did the Navy. Also, a larger percentage of the reasons given for committee decisions were programmatic for the Air Force's budget than they were for the Navy. It is not suggested that these two indicators are measures of the same behavior. However, upon reflection, it is not considered surprising that the results obtained for the two are closely related. An inclination toward programmatic decisions would indicate a Congressional desire to play a part in the policy-making and to help shape the composition of the weapon system programs. Micromanagement, as defined here, is reflected by highly detailed Congressional questions in the Design/Performance and Program Management subject areas. It would seem to follow quite logically then, that if for some reason, the Congress felt

the need to micromanage the Air Force to a greater extent during the Hearings, that they would also subsequently make more programmatic decisions on the Air Force's budget. This is, of course, what the results of this limited study indicate.

Further investigation of the possibility of a working relationship between these two variables is not warranted since they were not designed with this purpose in mind and as a result, have very definite areas of overlap. For example, all questions in the Force Structure subject category were classified as non-micromanagement, while budgetary decisions citing concerns with the services' force composition were categorized as programmatic decisions.

It is interesting to note at this point that in recent years, critics of the Congressional role in the defense budget process have often urged that Congress reassert itself and assume its Constitutionally mandated role as "keeper of the purse." Various students of the Congressional process have taken programmatic decision-making as a measure of Congress's assertion of power and have noted the increase of programmatic behavior in recent years [Refs. 3, 4, 16 and 20]. The results of this study indicate that this inclination toward programmatic decision-making has continued into the FY 1980 budget process. The data also suggest that Congressional micromanagement has been increasing as the programmatic decision-making behavior has been increasing.

So, while some laud the trend toward Congressional assumption of its rightful role in the budgetary process and call it programmatic decision-making, others, especially within DoD, are pleading for relief from increasing Congressional micromanagement.

This set of circumstances brings to light the dilemma surrounding the issue of micromanagement. On the one hand, Congress has been given major responsibilities and power by the Constitution as "keeper of the purse." To fulfill this responsibility, Congress must control spending, which in turn implies the formulation of substantive policy. However, given the size and complexity of the DoD budgets and the limited time and resources available for review, it is extremely difficult for Congress to make responsible, major policy decisions. It is far easier and indeed, more rational for Congress to concentrate on budget and program details. This approach does, in fact, allow Congress to work toward fulfilling its budgetary responsibilities since these details do, in the end, affect policy. Herein lies the dilemma -- Congress is increasingly being accused of micromanagement although this attention to detail may be the only rational approach they can follow to fulfill their Constitutional responsibilities.

This dilemma is certainly not a short term problem since its origins lie in the very design of our governmental system. As discussed in the introductory chapter to this

study, Richard Neustadt's "government of separated institutions sharing powers" results in a system of constant competition between the Executive and Congress. While this study provided little information to aid in the solution of this dilemma, it did demonstrate the very real nature of the problem and revealed its impact on the defense budget process.

While the results obtained here show that the Air Force has been subjected to more micromanagement than the Navy and that more of the decisions made on its budget were of a programmatic nature, the question of how the budget level has actually been changed remains to be discussed. As summarized previously, by all measures of funding change, the budget finally recommended for the Navy varied more from the original request than the Air Force budget did. The largest variations occurred in FY 79 and FY 80 when substantial budget increases were recommended for the Navy. The net budget increase recommended for the Navy in FY 79 was 4.3% and in FY 80 it was 12.6% of the original request. The comparable changes recommended to the Air Force's budgets were .8% and 1.2%. Similar results were obtained with the absolute change measure.

The reasons behind these results are, of course, unknown. Possibly the committees' interests in examining more details in the Air Force's budget generated confidence that the original request did not require changes of the same magnitude as the Navy. Perhaps, the Navy's funding requirements

were just greater during this timeframe. This would certainly correspond to the major controversy surrounding Naval Aviation's future mission and force structure. The debates within DoD and between DoD and Congress over such issues as the number and mix of aircraft required in the Fleet and the conventional aircraft versus V/STOL aircraft question have certainly contributed to the recommendations for substantial changes to the Navy's budget.

A final possible explanation for the larger changes in the Navy's budget centers on the suggestion by Laurance [Ref. 18, p. 227] and others that Congress becomes most involved in those issues that are being disputed within DoD. In reviewing the programs within the Navy's budget that were subjected to the largest changes, it became apparent that this phenomenon was indeed taking place here. Time after time, the programs most affected were those that had been subjected to the most intense debate during the DoD budget preparation cycle. It was often revealed in the Hearings testimony that the Navy's budget requests had been significantly altered during the DoD review process. The committee's subsequent budget decisions reflected a tendency to agree with the Navy's program recommendations over the DoD recommended program contained in the President's budget and to restore funding to the levels originally requested by the Navy.

Whatever the reasons are, it appears that adjustments to the budget were being recommended by the committee with the

intention of shaping the composition of the Naval Aviation Force. This Congressional interest in the Navy force structure is further borne out by the following:

- 1) Although even more programmatic decisions were made on the Air Force's budget than on the Navy's, still a majority of the Navy's decisions were also programmatic.
- 2) A much larger percentage of the questions asked of the Navy during the authorization Hearings were concerned with force structure - 16% for the Navy versus 4% for the Air Force.

Thus, from an overall standpoint, it would seem that the climate during the Congressional authorization process is generally favorable for Naval Aviation programs. This is especially true when compared to their primary competitor for funds, the Air Force's Tactical Aviation programs. The Air Force programs are subjected to more micromanagement questioning during the Hearings and a larger percentage of the committee decisions made on their budget reflect a programmatic orientation. Questioning of the Navy during the Hearings has less of a micromanagement tone and is concentrated more in the area of force structure. Committee decision-making is programmatic for the Navy, but not to the same degree that it is for the Air Force. However, the most important indicator of the Congressional climate, i.e., the actual budget changes recommended, clearly favor the Navy.

APPENDIX A

List of sample questions asked during the Authorization Hearings in the Program Management subject category. These questions are arranged in order of increasing "level of detail."

Why are these being provided CFE at this stage of this program instead of GFE?

It appears that the fact that the Air Force is not competing and providing GFE the warhead and the actuator is different than it is on most of the other missile programs. Apparently the Government feels it can save money on the other missile programs by providing these subsystems GFE. Can you explain why not on the Maverick?

And does the prime have a data package that would allow him to compete those?

The GAO recommended that DoD expedite modification of existing antiradiation missiles to improve their capabilities. Do you have an answer to that suggestion?

Are you also going to get a second source into the design program?

When you restart the Maverick production will you have competition for the rocket motor, the warhead, and the hydraulic control system?

What do the contract guarantees provide for?

How much of this missile does McDonnell Douglas actually make in their plant? They are the prime and they assemble it, but how much do they actually make?

)
etc.
)

What are you saying is you really wanted it; you determined you couldn't afford it within budget constraints?

It has been rumored, but no confirmation has been made by officials in OSD that the A-7E's are going out of the 1978 budget. Is that or is it not a fact?

Admiral, has the Secretary of Defense reached a decision in connection with the DSARC?

In view of the laser seeker development problems, does the Office of the Secretary of Defense plan to review the program under the DSARC process prior to the beginning of production?

}
etc.
}

So you will be buying more spares to get it up to 70 percent?

Why were engine spares increased over last year's planning?

I had the impression the support equipment was mobile enough to take it off of a carrier that went in for overhaul and then put it onto another one which was going to be deployed.

And you reduce the requirement on board ship for all of the spares for those two aircraft. They are reduced to less than half. Am I correct about that, Admiral?

}
etc.
}

What were the reasons for the two holds in the operational testing last year?

Will planned tests show the degree to which the various Maverick seekers are operationally effective in a close air support, anti-tank role and when will this information be made available to Congress?

The Air Force announced late last year its intentions to extend A-10 fatigue testing beyond two lifetimes. What is the status of these tests?

}
etc.
}

What is the status of the TF-30 engine program?

What is the SDLM repair program? Would you describe it?

Then you could pick up if this Congress approves the PEP program. Where will you be able to pick up the airplanes in the line?

Would you describe the Phoenix improvement program, tell us how long that development will take and how much it is going to cost for R&D?

}
etc.
}

Once you go beyond, you have to start doubling lines and do other things so the costs rise again.

Thirty-eight would be the optimum rate?

What is the production rate per month now?

So, what we are talking about is slowing down the purchase of this airplane which will cost us \$861 million more over the long run?

}
etc.
}

Do you have any production problems at this time in the program?

How does the FY 78 buy relate to the overall procurement schedule for the F-14A?

If the attrition buy was to be stretched out in order to keep a hot production base, at what point in your program would the stretchout start?

}
etc.

}
What is the current outlook for foreign sales for the F-15?

Now, how will that production be impacted if that letter of offer is negotiated?

What opportunities exist for tri-service standardization of missiles, seekers, designators and target acquisition aids?

So apparently there is quite a cost penalty in having these tri-service requirements?

}
etc.

}
Would you describe the history of the development and procurement of the avionics intermediate ship and tell us what are the lessons learned by the Air Force to be applied to future programs?

Is it fair to say that the reason you had all these problems in the early points is because of the crash program for the development of the F-14 and the amount of concurrency?

}
etc.

}
Why didn't Air Force officials advise the committees in March 1976 of the technical difficulties being experienced with development of the Maverick seeker?

I am just wondering how you can take F-15 money that was authorized and appropriated by Congress and put it into some other little kitty like that, if that is what this statement implies?

Where would Congress have an opportunity to either accept it or reject it?

The Congress provided the \$15 million in fiscal 1977 to do the work in upgrading the engine, and the question is why wasn't that money used as Congress directed?

APPENDIX B

Development of the Typology for analyzing the questions asked during the Authorization Hearings by identifying the "levels of detail" and by generating corresponding "typical questions" for each subject category.

Cost/Funding Category

- Level I - How will the program cost be impacted by changes in the type of procurement, the design or the schedule?
- Level II - How much will this particular portion of the program cost?
- Level III - What is the unit cost (flyaway, program unit, etc.) of this system?
- Level IV - What does this system cost compared to others? Is this system cost effective?
- Level V - How do you track and control costs?
- Level VI - What is this program's financial status?
- Level VII - What are the implications for total force or mission area financing?

Force Structure Category

- Level I - What is the inventory of this particular system?
- Level II - How does this inventory compare with your outfitting or operational plans and schedules?
- Level III - What mix of systems is required to meet your force needs?

Design/Performance Category

- Level I - Why is this system designed in this manner? Wouldn't it be better to be this other way?

- Level II - How fast (how far, how high, etc.) does this system operate? What is this particular design characteristic/design problem?
- Level III - How is this system employed operationally?
- Level IV - What overall performance or operational success do you expect to achieve? What is the life of the system? Which systems are compatible with each other?
- Level V - How does the performance of this system compare to others? Does the system meet its mission requirements?

Program Management Category

- Level I - How is this program being managed? Will you have competition? What type of contract will you have? Why are these items being procured as CFE instead of GFE?
- Level II - Will you have a DSARC decision? Have the requirements of OMB Circular A-109 been satisfied?
- Level III - Have you made adequate plans for supporting the system?
- Level IV - What are the specific results of this test program? What do these results mean?
- Level V - What is the status of this particular segment of the program?
- Level VI - What is the optimum production rate for this system?
- Level VII - What is the production schedule/program status? Do you have any production problems?
- Level VIII - What is the impact of FMS on this program? What is the relationship between this program and other DoD programs?
- Level IX - What management problems exist in the overall force? What lessons have been learned?
- Level X - Why wasn't the Congressional direction complied with? Why were the technical problems not disclosed to Congress?

Sample Worksheet Used For Categorizing by Subject Matter the Questions
Asked of Defense Witnesses During the Authorization Hearings.

USAF - FY 79

SASC - TACAIR

PROGRAM/PG. NO.	FUNDING / COST	FORCE STRUCTURE	DESIGN/PERFORMANCE		PROGRAM MANAGEMENT		OTHER
			I-III	IV & V	I-IV	V-X	
F-15/p. 4596	~~III~~ IIII	—	IIII	~~III~~ II	II	~~III~~ III	II
F-16/p. 4615	~~III~~ I	I	III	~~III~~	III	~~III~~ ~~III~~ II	—
A-10/p. 4645	—	—	II	~~III~~ II	~~III~~	~~III~~ I	I
Tactical Force Structure/p. 4511	II	I	IIII	~~III~~ III	~~III~~ IIII	~~III~~ ~~III~~	IIII
etc.							
Page Total	22	2	12	27	19	36	6

APPENDIX D

Sample Worksheets Used For Recording Committee Decisions And
For Categorizing These Decisions As Programmatic, Fiscal or
Other.

KEY TO CATEGORY ABBREVIATIONS

P - Programmatic

F - Fiscal

O - Other

FS/E - Force Structure/
Effectiveness
FM - Force Modernization
DEV - Development
P/J - Planning/Justification
CP - Congressional Policy

CT - Cost
IR - Improper Request
PM - Program Management

NO.	REF./PG.	PROGRAM	ACTION	REASON	CATEGORY
1	28/36	F-14A	\$217M	① Procurement of the F-14 at the rate of only 24 aircraft per year fails to address either the impending serious shortage of Navy fighter aircraft or the increasing threat from Soviet long-range naval aviation. Increasing the number of aircraft procured from 24 to 36 will decrease unit flyaway costs by \$3M and procurement at the rate of 36 aircraft per year will result in savings of \$686M over the life of the procurement program.	① P-FS/E ② P-FS/E ③ F-CT ④ F-CT
2	28/36	F-18	+437.2M	The procurement of only 15 aircraft in fiscal year 1980 would be uneconomical and inefficient. The FY 1980 request fails to meet even the minimum standards of economical and efficient procurement and lacks a sense of urgency in replacing the Navy's obsolete aircraft and aircraft lost from inventory.	① F-CT ② P-FS/E
3	28/35	C-9B	+73.8M	The committee believes that there is a continuing need for a Navy organic airlift capability... In addition to a need for responsiveness to time urgent requirements, the Navy's organic airlift is also closely related to the readiness and stability of the Naval Reserve.	① P-FS/E ② P-FM

USN - FY 80

SASC - R, D, T&E

NO.	REF./PG.	PROGRAM	ACTION	REASON	CATEGORY
1	24/89	A-6	\$1.2M	A-6 Squadrons - A reduction of \$1.2M from the Navy AWSACS (All Weather Standoff Acquisition System) is recommended since the Navy and Air Force have not yet agreed to coordinate similar efforts.	P-P/3
2	24/89	V/STOL	-2M	The Navy is planning to complete the sea based air study this year as well as other evaluations of V/STOL related activities. An authorization of only \$.5M in lieu of the \$2.5M requested is recommended to complete the report on this study...	P-P/3
6	24/90	A/G STANDOFF MISSILE	-6.2M	① ...DOD has deferred obligating \$2.2M of FY 79 funds, making these funds available for FY 80. In addition, ② since the program has been slowed, the FY 80 effort will not be as extensive as originally planned allowing a further reduction of \$4M.	① F-IR ② F-CT

USAF - FY 80

SASC - PROCUREMENT

NO.	REF./PG.	PROGRAM	ACTION	REASON	CATEGORY
1	34/27	A-7K	\$149.2M	The committee is of the opinion that the Air National Guard capabilities should be improved and therefore added funding...	P-FS/E
2	34/28	AWACS	-68M	The committee has earlier expressed the view that 25 AWACS...should satisfy requirements. The committee recommends deletion of the \$68M advanced procurement funding towards any further procurement of the AWACS aircraft for the Air Force. This is consistent with the committee's prior position that these additional planned aircraft are not required...	P-P/5
4	34/30	C-130H	+79M	The C-130 is used for intra-theater tactical airlift missions. The Air Force did not request procurement of this aircraft in the 1980 budget request. The committee authorized \$79M to procure 8 of these aircraft for Air National Guard airlift units.	9

APPENDIX E

Compilation of all results obtained from analyzing the adjustments to the Navy's and Air Force's budget requests as recommended by the HASC and SASC.

Changes to the Navy's PROCUREMENT Budget Request (\$ in Thousands)

	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980
Budget Request	\$3,993,900	\$4,444,800	\$4,390,300
NET Changes			
-HASC	-\$3,800	+\$476,080	+\$702,104
-SASC	-\$181,900	+\$84,700	+\$391,600
ABSOLUTE Changes			
-HASC	\$52,600	\$714,280	\$902,104
-SASC	\$374,700	\$409,700	\$489,200

Changes to the Air Force's PROCUREMENT Budget Request (\$ in Thousands)

	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980
Budget Request	\$6,613,900	\$7,206,300	\$8,190,900
NET Changes			
-HASC	+\$672,400	+\$159,700	+\$135,190
-SASC	-\$40,000	+\$64,500	+\$93,400
ABSOLUTE Changes			
-HASC	\$796,800	\$482,300	\$499,190
-SASC	\$52,100	\$479,700	\$393,000

Changes to the Navy's R,D,T&E Budget Request
(\$ in Thousands)

	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980
Budget Request	\$1,050,050	\$1,331,953	\$1,130,246
NET Changes			
-HASC	-\$100,410	-\$170,609	+\$129,760
-SASC	-\$3,740	+\$81,690	+\$162,786
ABSOLUTE Changes			
-HASC	\$152,410	\$254,009	\$268,240
-SASC	\$3,740	\$162,110	\$207,214

Changes to the Air Force's R,D,T&E Budget Request
(\$ in Thousands)

	FY 1978	FY 1979	FY 1980
Budget Request	\$948,300	\$1,120,700	\$1,135,544
NET Changes			
-HASC	-\$295,600	-\$70,300	+\$41,400
-SASC	-\$66,200	-\$37,700	-\$29,500
ABSOLUTE Changes			
-HASC	\$343,800	\$83,100	\$138,400
-SASC	\$66,200	\$91,700	\$41,500

Compilation of all results obtained by categorizing the reasons given for committee decisions as - Fiscal, Programmatic or Other.

DECISIONS ON NAVY'S BUDGET

	<u>FY 1978</u>			<u>FY 1979</u>			<u>FY 1980</u>		
	Fiscal	Prog.	Other	Fiscal	Prog.	Other	Fiscal	Prog.	Other
HASC:									
-Procurement	1	3	0	4	5	0	7	10	0
-R,D,T&E	3	4	1	4	4	0	1	2	0
SUBTOTAL	4	7	1	8	9	0	8	12	0
SASC:									
-Procurement	3	5	1	3	3	0	4	6	0
-R,D,T&E	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	5	0
SUBTOTAL	5	7	1	5	5	0	6	11	0
USN GRAND TOTAL	9	14	2	13	14	0	14	23	0

DECISIONS ON AIR FORCE'S BUDGET

	<u>FY 1978</u>			<u>FY 1979</u>			<u>FY 1980</u>		
	Fiscal	Prog.	Other	Fiscal	Prog.	Other	Fiscal	Prog.	Other
HASC:									
-Procurement	4	5	0	2	5	0	3	5	0
-R,D,T&E	5	6	1	2	2	0	7	9	0
SUBTOTAL	9	11	1	4	7	0	10	14	0
SASC:									
-Procurement	2	3	0	2	7	0	1	4	1
-R,D,T&E	0	5	2	2	7	0	0	5	0
SUBTOTAL	2	8	2	4	14	0	1	9	1
USAF GRAND TOTAL	11	19	3	8	21	0	11	23	1

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